World Politics News   Articles for World Politics Course

The US has asserted that it will blockade all oil tankers from Venezuela on a sanction list. This action follows the seizure of the oil tanker Skipper that was carrying 2 million barrels of crude oil destined for Cuba. Generally speaking, a blockade is considered an act of war but the Trump Administration has not asked the Congress for a declaration of war, nor has it met the requirements of the War Powers Act. Nonetheless, Trump has deployed a massive military buildup off the coast of Venezuela acting on his asserted authority as Commander-in-Chief. The Washington Post listed all the military assets deployed as of today.

I doubt that the US is contemplating an invasion of Venezuela (but I also doubt that Trump has thought that far). His intention is to create economic chaos in Venezuela that will lead to the overthrow of President Maduro. This particular playbook was actually used by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (now known as BP) in 1951 against Iran after Iran nationalized its holdings. The company effectively blockaded Iran from selling its oil to others by following oil tankers leaving Iran and using the courts to prevent the sale of what it called “stolen” oil. Eventually, the Iranian economy collapsed and with a shove from the US CIA led to the overthrow of the president of the country and leading to the rule of the Shah of Iran.

The Iranian example is instructive since the Iranian regime that toppled the Shah in 1979 led to the creation of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the longstanding bitterness between Iran and the US today. The US has a poor track record of regime change. It did not work in Vietnam in 1963 when South Vietnamese President Diem was assassinated or when the US overthrew Iraqi President Hussein in 2003. Other examples include the overthrow of Guatemalan President in 1954 and the toppling President Allende of Chile in 1973. Regime change is a policy adopted by states that pay little attention to the long-term consequences of meddling in the internal affair of other states.

But there is another thread in the Venezuela situation that has not received sufficient attention. Venezuela has the largest oil deposits in the world although its oil is heavy with sulfur and thus requires significant refining in order to be useful. The main seller of Venezuelan oil in the US is a company called Citgo, and it has three refineries in the US. But the US took control of Citgo properties in 2018 using the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FISA). In December 2025 Citgo shares were sold to a US company called Amber Energy with a $5.9 billion bid.

What’s interesting about Amber Energy is that one of its primary backers is Elliott Investment Management, a hedge fund based in West Palm Beach, Florida and whose primary sponsor is Paul Singer. Singer is often termed a venture capitalist (some call him a “vulture” capitalist) and an example of his activities was in profiting from Argentina’s debt problem in the early 2000s:

“Perhaps the most infamous chapter of Singer’s career is his prolonged battle with the government of Argentina over defaulted sovereign bonds. In the early 2000s, Argentina experienced a financial crisis that led to the country defaulting on its debt. While many creditors agreed to restructure their bonds at a fraction of their original value, Elliott Management refused, demanding full repayment. What followed was a 15-year legal and financial battle that saw Singer’s firm seize Argentine naval vessels and block international payments. In 2016, the dispute culminated in a $2.4 billion payout to Elliott Management, a victory that underscored Singer’s tenacity and strategic prowess.”

Regime change might result in a US company controlling all of Venezuela’s oil (if Maduro does leave, his most likely successor would be María Corina Machado who would likely have Trump’s blessing, although her political power will be sorely tested if she does not protest the US actions). In short, a US company would have control over Venezuela’s massive reserves.

Trump’s actions against Venezuela are reprehensible and short-sighted. The long-term consequences of Trump’s “gunboat” diplomacy will weaken US credibility and prestige, all in the name of preserving the viability of fossil fuel hegemony in the US. It is a fool’s errand and completely out of touch with the world as it currently operates.

This morning’s headline for the online version of the New York Times was “U.S. enters War Against Iran”. The headline is misleading. The more accurate headline would have been “US President Trump Declares War on Iran”. The actual headline ignores the fact that the US has been engaged in coercive diplomacy against Iran since 2018 when President Trump withdrew the US from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) which was considered by most analysts as an effective check on any nuclear ambitions that Iran might have held, although there was no evidence at the time (nor two days ago) that Iran had made a decision to build a nuclear weapon:

“More than three years of Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA from January 2016-May 2019 demonstrated its nonproliferation benefits. Taken together, the array of restrictions on uranium enrichment ensures that Iran’s capability to produce enough weapons-grade uranium sufficient for one warhead would be approximately 12 months for a decade or more. The JCPOA also effectively eliminated Iran’s ability to produce and separate plutonium for at least 15 years. Just as importantly, the JCPOA mandates unprecedented international monitoring and transparency measures that make it very likely that any possible future effort by Iran to pursue nuclear weapons, even a clandestine program, would be detected promptly.”

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu had held for a long time that Iran’s nuclear program represented an “existential threat” to Israel. Indeed, he warned about the Iranian nuclear program when he was just a member of the Knesset in 1992:

“Since 1992, when Netanyahu addressed Israel’s Knesset as an MP, he has consistently claimed that Tehran is only years away from acquiring a nuclear bomb. ‘Within three to five years, we can assume that Iran will become autonomous in its ability to develop and produce a nuclear bomb,’ he declared at the time. The prediction was later repeated in his 1995 book, Fighting Terrorism.

“The sense of imminent threat has repeatedly shaped Netanyahu’s engagement with United States officials. In 2002, he appeared before a US congressional committee, advocating for the invasion of Iraq and suggesting that both Iraq and Iran were racing to obtain nuclear weapons. The US-led invasion of Iraq followed soon after, but no weapons of mass destruction were found.”

Netanyahu has worried about Iran for 33 years and yet the Iranians never developed a nuclear bomb, even though it clearly had the expertise and means to do so. Instead, Iran adhered to its commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and refused to take that path, despite being surrounded by nuclear powers: Russia to the north, China to the east, India and Pakistan to its southeast, Israel to its west, and US air and sea forces parked in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and in bases in Oman and Bahrain. Netanyahu went so far as to bring a visual aid to the UN General Assembly to communicate his fears about Iran.

We should be clear about what Netanyahu regards as an “existential threat”. Does Netanyahu actually believe that Iran would drop a nuclear bomb on Israel, killing millions of Palestinians in the process? One cannot dismiss the possibility that at some point there will be an Iranian regime that would commit such a heinous crime. But one would have to offer more evidence of Iranian indifference to human life to persuade me that such an outcome was likely. There are currently nine nuclear powers in the world and some of them engaged in reckless propaganda (“godless communists” and “capitalist running dogs” are two of my favorites) that is roughly comparable to Iranian propaganda (“America is Satan”). But none of these states, except for the US, has ever dropped a nuclear bomb

The existential threat that Netanyahu fears is the possibility of Israeli self-deterrence in the face of a nuclear Iran. Nuclear threats are taken seriously by civilian populations and are effective even when palpably implausible. The US threatened nuclear war against China in 1956 over two insigificant islands (Quemoy and Matsu) which were controlled by the Republic of China, now known as Taiwan. Similarly, the US refrained from arming Ukraine with advanced weaponry after Russian President Putin started referring to Russian nuclear capabilities. Israel currently has a free military hand in Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and it has used that advantage to its benefit after the attacks of 7 October. A nuclear-armed Iran, however, might restrain Israeli military power just by posing the possibility of a nuclear attack, forcing the Israeli people to ask the question “Is dropping more bombs on the Gaza Strip worth risking nuclear annihilation?” States are reluctant to gamble on their existence, even when the odds are in their favor. An Israeli government may not want to be constrained by an Israeli population afraid of a nuclear attack. And that fear is the real existential threat to Israel.

The last few weeks have been confusing. There were statements that the US wanted to restart the negotiations to revive the JCPOA, but refused to entertain the possibility that Iran would be allowed to enrich Uranium, a right guaranteed by the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the JCPOA. The precipitating event for the Israeli attack on Iran was the Iranian decision on 13 April to enrich its Uranium far beyond the traditional limit of 20% which is considered essential for civilian nuclear power purposes (Iran believes that it makes more money selling its petroleum rather than burning it for energy purposes). But the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute interpeted this decision quite differently than one designed to build a nuclear bomb:

‘On 13 April, Iran announced its intention to enrich uranium to 60 per cent U-235. This was characterized by Iran as a response to a sabotage of its vast underground enrichment cascades at Natanz two days before. The move comes against the backdrop of sensitive negotiations happening in Vienna aimed at rescuing the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and bringing the United States back into compliance with the deal…

“Uranium enriched to 60 per cent cannot be used to make a useful nuclear explosive device, and Iran has no other realistic use for this material. 

“Nevertheless, 60 per cent was not an arbitrary choice. Cascades of centrifuges are designed to enrich uranium in steps; Iran’s centrifuges are likely set up to enrich up to 20 per cent, from 20 to 60 per cent, and from 60 to 90 per cent. Assuming the 60 per cent-enriched uranium is stored in the form of uranium hexafluoride (UF₆) gas—and there would be no point in Iran converting it to any other chemical form—the enrichment step from 60 per cent-enriched to weapons-grade uranium is very short.

“This strongly suggests that Iran’s decision was intended to send a political message: ‘We have gone as far as we can go in response to provocations without producing weapons-grade uranium.’”

One needs to appreciate the position of Iran after Trump pulled the US out of the JCPOA: it was placed under punishing sanctions which have severely damaged the Iranian economy and was not offered any way to remove those sanctions without giving up its right to enrich Uranium. The question we need to answer is whether the decision to enrich Uranium to 60% actually signaled an intent to build a nuclear bomb. Trump’s Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, was explicit on this question: “In March, Gabbard testified on Capitol Hill that the U.S. ‘continues to assess that Iran is not building a nuclear weapon and Supreme Leader Khamenei has not authorized the nuclear weapons program he suspended in 2003.'”  Trump insisted that Gabbard was wrong, but that is not the first time he has disagreed with his own intelligence services.

We should also think about Trump’s decision to declare war on Iran in the context of the US Constitution. Only Congress has the right to declare war: “Article I, Section 8, Clause 11 states that Congress has the power to declare war. Initially, the draft of the Constitution granted Congress the power to make war. There were suggestions to give this power solely to the President, solely to the Senate, or to both the President and the Senate. However, the Framers decided that involving both the President and Congress addressed their concerns. They didn’t want just one person to decide something so significant, nor did they trust a single branch alone.” The wisdom of the writers of the Constitution has been lost. Iran did not attack the US, so the US claim of self-defense is hollow. Nor does Iran have any ability to hit the US mainland with a nuclear bomb or any conventional bomb. Iran does pose a threat of terror attacks on US citizens, but such threats are better dealt with by local officials and not the US military.

Now the US and Iran are in a state of war. Iran does not need to declare war on the US for a state of war to exist–the US attack on Iranian territory constituted a state of war. For example, the US declared war on Japan after the Pearl Harbor attack, but Roosevelt wanted to focus on fighting Germany immediately (he didn’t have much choice since the US fleet was at the bottom of the Pacific and therefore didn’t have the ability to fight Japan immediately). Foolishly, Hitler declared war on the US first, relieving the US of the need to make a decision about declaring war against Germany. Now that the US has created a state of war, it is imperative to ask the question: What are the US war objectives?

The US is still committed to preventing the Iranians from developing a nuclear bomb. We have yet to see whether the US attack effectively destroyed Iranian capabilities. Trump declared that the facilities had been “completely and totally obliterated” but we have no way to confirm that assessment (it’s not clear on what evidence he based this assertion). More importantly, there is no way for the US to destroy the knowledge that Iran has about building a bomb. That knowledge will endure if the Iranians want it to endure. At best, the US and Israel have gained some time derailing Iran nuclear intentions, but to maintain that respite, Israel and the US will have to keep bombing Iran anytime there is a suspicion that Iran is engaged in nuclear-related activities.

Unless, of course, that the Israeli and US intention is to force regime change in Iran in order to prevent any government that would attempt to build a bomb. The US has often forced regime change (Iran 1953; Guatemala, 1954; the Dominican Republic in 1965; Grenada, 1983; Panama, 1989; and Iraq in 2003). One would be hard pressed to assert that these efforts genuinely served the US national interest. And it is more likely that the Iranian people will want a more aggressive regime given the humiliation inflicted on them by the Israeli and US attacks. They may welcome a new regime that is less stringent in terms of personal conduct. But given the obvious failures of the current regime to prevent the wholesale leakage of Iranian secrets, it is more likely that Iranians would support greater scrutiny (how else does one explain the precision Israeli attacks against specific military and scientific individuals in early June? Someone was telling the Israelis names, addresses, and times, and it is likely that the Iranians will direct most of their efforts to uproot those spies).

I suspect that the Iranians will do two things. First, they will announce their withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty which allows states to abrogate the treaty after 90 days of warning. Since Israel and the US did not believe that Iran was adhering to the treaty, the repercussions of such a move would be small diplomatically. There will, however, a great deal of negative press for the Iranians, but both the US and Israel have muzzled the press on this matter already. Leaving the NPT would end the pretense that a nuclear weapon is not necessary for national defense against nuclear powers. Iraq proved that nuclear weapons are the only way to prevent an invasion, and North Korea proved that breaking the NPT does not preclude engagement with nuclear powers. Furthermore, the Iranians do not have a choice unless they wish to submit to the dictates of Israel–their previous strategy of relying on proxies and air defenses was an abject failure. Israel has forced the Iranian hand on this matter.

Second, Iran will likely make noises about shutting down the Strait of Hormuz, a narrow channel through which 40% of the world’s exported petroleum passes. Noises could go from verbal threats to actually blocking the channel with sunken vessels. The threats are probably sufficient to force insurance rates for oil-carrying cargo shops to skyrocket. That alone would focus the attention of India, Europe, and China on finding a better solution to this state of war. Moreover, it would force Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States to gauge their interests less in alignment with the interests of the US. Finally, a spike in oil prices would doom Republican chances in the mid-term elections in 2026.

For me, the most unfortunate aspect of this remarkable event is that allowing this war to be declared unilaterally by the President has insulated US foreign policy from democratic processes. Foreign policy has almost always been determined by small groups of people (did you notice that as Trump delivered his speech at the White House announcing the bombing, he was flanked by Hegseth, Rubio, and Vance?), and moving foreign policy in the democratic process was an arduous and difficult process which began with the Vietnam War. That process was never completed and today it seems to be unattainable.

The chances of a wider regional war in the Middle East have increased over the last few days. Up until recently, the main military activity has been the Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip, while there have been sporadic military operations between the Israelis and Houthi and Hezbollah forces. Israel has escalated its attacks in Lebanon, attacking a site in Beirut to target a Hezbollah operative, and today it targeted a Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh , in Teheran, Iran. According to the Associated Press:

“Iranian U.N. Ambassador Amir Saeid Iravani in a letter on Wednesday blamed both strikes on Israel. He and said they ‘suggest an intention to escalate conflict and expand the war through the entire region.’ He called on the international community for ‘decisive action to address these violations and hold the perpetrators accountable.’”

Israel has taken responsibility for the strike in Beirut, saying it killed a top Hezbollah commander. But Israel has been silent about the strike that killed Haniyeh, though it had vowed to kill him and other Hamas leaders over the group’s Oct. 7 attack that sparked the war in Gaza.

Israel has not claimed responsibility for the assassination of Haniyeh, but has in the case of senior Hezbollah commander Fouad Shukur in Lebanon. Israel, however, has a long list of targeted assassinations in the region. It is difficult to overstate the significance of the more recent assassinations. To be clear, bombing another country is always regarded as an act of war, and Israel has now bombed targets in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. Israel believes that its actions are simply a logical extension of its war against Hamas, but that narrow perspective is not justified: no state can ignore the consequences of such attacks on its sovereignty.

The attacks confirm my suspicions that Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu is trying to escalate the conflict. First, Haniyeh was killed while he was attending the inauguration of the new Iranian President, Masoud Pezeshkian. Pezeshkian is considered a moderate, breaking away from the hardline views of his two predecessors. But the attack will only strengthen the hands of the hardliners in Iran, particularly since the attack was an embarassment to the Iranian defense forces–the attack was done by a precision-guided missile against a target in the capital city of Tehran. Moreover, Haniyeh was a guest in Tehran and the protection of guests is a sacred obligation in Islam.

Second, Haniyeh was a principal negotiator in the current negotiations for a cease-fire in Gaza. There is probably no greater way to sabotage negotiations than to actually kill one of the interlocutors. Moreover, Israel has recently attached more preconditions to a ceasefire that was described by an Israeli official in these terms in an article in Axios: “Netanyahu wants a deal that is impossible to get. At the moment he isn’t willing to move and therefore we might be headed for a crisis in the negotiations rather than a deal”.

There is little question but that Iran and its proxies, Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, will respond to the Israeli attacks. The last time Israel provoked Iran back in April by killing senior Hezbollah officials in Damascus, the Iranians chose a relatively calibrated response. According to The Economist:

“Iran has struck Israel directly once before: it launched more than 300 missiles and drones at Israel in April, retaliation for an Israeli strike that killed several high-ranking officers at Iran’s embassy compound in Damascus. Israel hit back with a pinpoint strike on an Iranian anti-aircraft radar, and the round was over.

“This time, Iran will have to decide whether it can risk a bigger conflagration. It is going through a sensitive political moment. Mr Haniyeh was killed hours after he attended the inauguration of Masoud Pezeshkian, the new Iranian president, who was elected after his predecessor was killed in a helicopter crash in May. This was probably not how he envisioned his first day on the job.”

The calibrated Iranian response was also blunted by a coalition of forces in the region to shoot down most of the missiles fired from Iran. The Center for Strategic and International Studies assessed the missile defense effort:

“This episode represents an outstanding success story for air and missile defense. Despite the over 300 ballistic missiles, drones, and cruise missiles launched, there appears to have been minimal damage to Israeli infrastructure and military assets, and the attack resulted in only one Israeli casualty.

It was also a joint effort. The coalition was led by the United States and featured the United Kingdom, France, and Jordan, in addition to Israel. Coordination took place at the Combined Air Operations Center at Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, which helped to prevent any friendly fire incidents. Although Saudi Arabia has denied direct involvement, the kingdom at least allowed U.S. aircraft stationed in the country to engage Iranian air threats. Israel’s Arab neighbors also may have contributed intelligence and sensor assets to detect and track Iranian air threats, although the extent of this cooperation remains unclear. U.S. policymakers have long advocated for an integrated missile defense in the region, and this joint operation helps illustrate why.”

The Iranian government thus has to decide what an “appropriate” response should be, but it needs to take into account the lessons of the earlier April attack and try to overwhelm the missile defense capabilities of Israel and the US-led coalition. I do not have the technical expertise to speculate on what that number of missiles might be, and I suspect that the US will try to shoot down as many of those missiles as it can which is also a number I do not know.

But there is a more important insight to gain from the April attack. The US and the coalition of allies offering missile defenses are providing a shield which insulates Israel from any real consequences to its actions. That course if action is unwise since it allows the Netanyahu government to take actions which have negatively affected the US, Israel, and the Palestinian people.