Over the next few days, I will examine the status of an American attack on Syria using the framework of the Just War Doctrine. As the US and the world comes closer to making a decision whether to use force in response to the alleged chemical attack by the Syrian government, we all, as citizens, need to make up our own minds as to the morality of such a response. The Just War Doctrine is one such framework. It is not a legal code, but rather a series of questions that force an observer to examine specific points which may often be ignored by statespeople as they work to serve their respective country’s national interest rather than the collective morality of humanity.
As a refresher, here are the principles of the Just War:
- A just war can only be waged as a last resort. All non-violent options must be exhausted before the use of force can be justified.
- A war is just only if it is waged by a legitimate authority. Even just causes cannot be served by actions taken by individuals or groups who do not constitute an authority sanctioned by whatever the society and outsiders to the society deem legitimate.
- A just war can only be fought to redress a wrong suffered. For example, self-defense against an armed attack is always considered to be a just cause (although the justice of the cause is not sufficient–see point #4). Further, a just war can only be fought with “right” intentions: the only permissible objective of a just war is to redress the injury.
- A war can only be just if it is fought with a reasonable chance of success. Deaths and injury incurred in a hopeless cause are not morally justifiable.
- The ultimate goal of a just war is to re-establish peace. More specifically, the peace established after the war must be preferable to the peace that would have prevailed if the war had not been fought.
- The violence used in the war must be proportional to the injury suffered. States are prohibited from using force not necessary to attain the limited objective of addressing the injury suffered.
- The weapons used in war must discriminate between combatants and non-combatants. Civilians are never permissible targets of war, and every effort must be taken to avoid killing civilians. The deaths of civilians are justified only if they are unavoidable victims of a deliberate attack on a military target.
In today’s post, I will examine the first principle. Is a US military attack truly a last resort to a wrong suffered? Has the US exhausted all other non-violent options?
The conflict in Syria began as part of a regional phenomenon dubbed the “Arab Spring.” The movement starts in December of 2010 in Tunisia and spread throughout the Middle East. In January 2011 protests began in Syria against the lack of human rights. The Arab League was the first international organization to initiate a peace process in Syria and in November 2011 the Syrian government agreed to let League observers into the country to monitor how the protests were being handled by the government. The League noted a wide variety of humanitarian abuses and by January 2012 the League withdrew its monitors. The Arab League, however, did introduce a resolution to the UN Security Council on 31 January 2012 calling upon Syrian President Assad to step down. Russia and China both vetoed the resolution.
The UN then launched a peace effort led by former UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan. Annan specifically tried to enlist Russian support, and a UN peace-keeping mission was sent to Syria. Annan resigns his position because he believes the peacekeeping mission was not viable and in June 2012, the peacekeeping mission is suspended. Throughout the period, violence in Syria only escalated.
Lakhdar Brahimi, a representative of the Arab League, takes over Annan’s position. In May/June 2013, both the US and Russia propose a peace conference to be held in Geneva to resolve the violence. That meeting is postponed by the US, and although still proposed, does not seem to be highly likely.
Finally the G8 Summit held in June 2013 devoted a great deal of its agenda to the situation in Syria. No proposals emerged from those discussions.
The most recent discussions on Syria, the G20 meeting in St. Petersburg, revealed large cleavages in the international community about the prospects for peace in Syria. No proposals emerged from these discussions, and most of the participants prefer to wait for the UN to issue its report on the facts of the chemical weapons assault before making a decision.
There is little question that there have been sustained and serious attempts to resolve the conflict peacefully. These attempts have failed, for a variety of reasons. One could make the argument that Requirement #1 of the Just War Doctrine has been satisfied.
I will take up Requirement #2 tomorrow.
As Presidents Obama and Putin meet in St. Petersburg for the G-20 meeting, their respective navies are also meeting in the eastern Mediterranean. There has been a dramatic influx of navies close to Syria as the crisis there has ratcheted up. There’s very little likelihood that there will be confrontation at sea, but one needs to be on the lookout for miscalculations and missteps that may lead to an escalation of tension.

The G-20 meeting produced a fascinating diplomatic dust-up. Dimitry Peskov, President Putin’s spokesperson, referred to Great Britain as “that small little island … that no one listens to.” The remark was apparently in reference to the embarrassment that Prime Minister Cameron suffered when the House of Commons rejected his call for the use of force in Syria. Unfortunately, such are the typical consequences when a power loses credibility on issues of force. The pressure will now be on Great Britain to restore that credibility.
There is a huge difference between the draft Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF) submitted by President Obama and the AUMF recently passed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The changes are instructive and represent the lessons learned by the Congress in the wars from Vietnam to Iraq. Here are the drafts of both resolutions–study the differences carefully.
Draft Resolution on Syria, submitted by President Obama to the Congress of the United States, 31 August 2013
Whereas, on August 21, 2013, the Syrian government carried out a chemical weapons attack in the suburbs of Damascus, Syria, killing more than 1,000 innocent Syrians;
Whereas these flagrant actions were in violation of international norms and the laws of war;
Whereas the United States and 188 other countries comprising 98 percent of the world’s population are parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling or use of chemical weapons;
Whereas, in the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, Congress found that Syria’s acquisition of weapons of mass destruction threatens the security of the Middle East and the national security interests of the United States;
Whereas the United Nations Security Council, in Resolution 1540 (2004), affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security;
Whereas, the objective of the United States’ use of military force in connection with this authorization should be to deter, disrupt, prevent, and degrade the potential for, future uses of chemical weapons or other weapons of mass destruction;
Whereas, the conflict in Syria will only be resolved through a negotiated political settlement, and Congress calls on all parties to the conflict in Syria to participate urgently and constructively in the Geneva process; and
Whereas, unified action by the legislative and executive branches will send a clear signal of American resolve.
SEC. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES
(a) Authorization.– The President is authorized to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in connection with the use of chemical weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in the conflict in Syria in order to–
(1) prevent or deter the use or proliferation (including the transfer to terrorist groups or other state or non-actors) within, to or from Syria, of any weapons of mass destruction, including chemical or biological weapons or components of or materials used in such weapons, or;
(2) protect the United States and its allies and partners against the threat posed by such weapons
(b) War Powers Resolution Requirements–
(1) Specific Statutory Authorization–Consistent with section of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.
(2) Applicability of other requirements–Nothing in this joint resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.
On September 4, 2013, the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations debated the resolution: “Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against the Government of Syria to Respond to Use of Chemical Weapons.”
To authorize the limited and tailored use of the United States Armed Forces against Syria.
Whereas Syria is in material breach of the laws of war by having employed chemical weapons against its civilian population;
Whereas the abuses of the regime of Bashar al-Assad have included the brutal repression and war upon its own civilian population, resulting in more than 100,000 people killed in the past two years, and more than 2 million internally displaced people and Syrian refugees in Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and Iraq, creating an unprecedented regional crisis and instability;
Whereas the Assad regime has the largest chemical weapons programs in the region and has demonstrated its capability and willingness to repeatedly use weapons of mass destruction against its own people, including the August 21, 2013 attack in the suburbs of Damascus in which the Assad regime murdered over 1,000 innocent people, including hundreds of children;
Whereas there is clear and compelling evidence of the direct involvement of Assad regime forces and senior officials in the planning, execution, and after-action attempts to cover-up the August 21 attack, and hide or destroy evidence of such attack;
Whereas the Arab League has declared with regards to the August 21 incident to hold the “Syrian regime responsible for this heinous crime”;
Whereas the United Nations Security Council, in Resolution 1540 (2004) affirmed that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons constitutes a threat to international peace and security;
Whereas in the Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2003, Congress found that Syria’s acquisition of weapons of mass destruction threatens the security of the Middle East and the national security interests of the United States;
Whereas the actions and conduct of the Assad regime are in direct contravention of Syria’s legal obligations under the United Nations Charter, the Geneva Conventions, and the Geneva Protocol to the Hague Convention on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, and also violates standards set forth in the Chemical Weapons Convention;
Whereas Syria’s use of weapons of mass destruction and its conduct and actions constitute a grave threat to regional stability, world peace, and the national security interests of the United States and its allies and partners;
Whereas the objectives of the United States use of military force in connection with this authorization are to respond to the use, and deter and degrade the potential future use of weapons of mass destruction by the Syrian government;
Whereas the conflict in Syria will only be resolved through a negotiated political settlement, and Congress calls on all parties to the conflict in Syria to participate urgently and constructively in the Geneva process; and
Whereas the President has authority under the Constitution to use force in order to defend the national security interests of the United States:
Now, therefore, be it,
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This joint resolution may be cited as the “Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against the Government of Syria to Respond to Use of Chemical Weapons”.
SECTION 2. AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.
(a) AUTHORIZATION-The President is authorized, subject to subsection (b), to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in a limited and tailored manner against legitimate military targets in Syria, only to: (1) respond to the use of weapons of mass destruction by the Syrian government in the conflict in Syria; (2) deter Syria’s use of such weapons in order to protect the national security interests of the United States and to protect our allies and partners against the use of such weapons; and (3) degrade Syria’s capacity to use such weapons in the future.
(b) REQUIREMENT FOR DETERMINATION THAT USE OF MILITARY FORCE IS NECESSARY- Before exercising the authority granted in subsection (a), the President shall make available to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate his determination that—
(1) the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to prevent the deployment and use of weapons of mass destruction by Syria;
(2) the Syrian government has conducted one or more significant chemical weapons attacks;
(3) the use of military force is necessary to respond to the use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government;
(4) it is in the core national security interest of the United States to use such military force;
(5) the United States has a military plan to achieve the specific goals of responding to the use of weapons of mass destruction by the Syrian government in the conflict in Syria, to deter Syria’s use of such weapons in order to protect the national security interests of the United States and to protect our allies and partners against the use of such weapons, and to degrade Syria’s capacity to use such weapons in the future; and
(6) the use of military force is consistent with and furthers the goals of the United States strategy toward Syria, including achieving a negotiated political settlement to the conflict.
(c) WAR POWERS RESOLUTION REQUIREMENTS-
(1) SPECIFIC STATUTORY AUTHORIZATION- Consistent with section 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541, et seq., the Congress declares that this section is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, within the limits of the authorization established under this Section.
(2) APPLICABILITY OF OTHER REQUIREMENTS- Nothing in this resolution supersedes any requirement of the War Powers Resolution.
SECTION 3. LIMITATION. The authority granted in section 2 does not authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces on the ground in Syria for the purpose of combat operations.
SECTION 4. TERMINATION OF THE AUTHORIZATION FOR THE USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES.
The authorization in section 2(a) shall terminate 60 days after the date of the enactment of this joint resolution, except that the President may extend, for a single period of 30 days, such authorization if –
(1) the President determines and certifies to Congress, not later than 5 days before the date of termination of the initial authorization, that the extension is necessary to fulfill the purposes of this resolution as defined by Section 2(a) due to extraordinary circumstances and for ongoing and impending military operations against Syria under section 2(a); and
(2) Congress does not enact into law, before the extension of authorization, a joint resolution disapproving the extension of the authorization for the additional 30 day period; provided that any such joint resolution shall be considered under the expedited procedures otherwise provided for concurrent resolutions of disapproval contained in section 7 of the War Powers Resolution (50 U.S.C. 1546).
SECTION 5. SYRIA STRATEGY.
Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this resolution, the President shall consult with Congress and submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives an integrated United States Government strategy for achieving a negotiated political settlement to the conflict in Syria, including a comprehensive review of current and planned U.S. diplomatic, political, economic, and military policy towards Syria, including: (1) the provision of all forms of assistance to the Syrian Supreme Military Council and other Syrian entities opposed to the government of Bashar Al-Assad that have been properly and fully vetted and share common values and interests with the United States; (2) the provision of all forms of assistance to the Syrian political opposition, including the Syrian Opposition Coalition; (3) efforts to isolate extremist and terrorist groups in Syria to prevent their influence on the future transitional and permanent Syrian governments; (4) coordination with allies and partners; and (5) efforts to limit support from the Government of Iran and others for the Syrian regime.
SECTION 6. CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION AND REPORTING.
(a) Notification and Provision of Information. Upon his determination to use the authority set forth in section 2 of this Act, the President shall notify Congress, including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, of the use of such authority and shall keep Congress fully and currently informed of the use of such authority.
(b) Reports. No fewer than 10 days after the initiation of military operations under the authority provided by Section 2, and every 20 days thereafter until the completion of military operations, the President shall submit to the Congress, including the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, a report on the status of such operations, including progress achieved toward the objectives specified in Section 2(a), the financial costs of operations to date, and an assessment of the impact of the operations on the Syrian regime’s chemical weapons capabilities and intentions.
SECTION 7. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. The authority set forth in Section 2 of this resolution shall not constitute an authorization for the use of force or a declaration of war except to the extent that it authorizes military action under the conditions, for the specific purposes, and for the limited period of time set forth in this resolution.