One of the very interesting things about the conflict in Syria is the fact that the US and Iran have somewhat compatible interests. The Iranians want President Assad to survive, and the US does not want the Sunni rebels who wish to overthrow Assad to succeed. Though these interests are not the same, these interests are both opposed to Saudi Arabia’s interest which is to see the Sunni insurgents succeed. If given a choice, the US would likely prefer Assad to survive rather than see a radical regime seize power in Syria. If Iran and the US could see their mutual interests, there may be a better opportunity to bring peace. If Assad were to survive, perhaps the US could demand a clear policy of reconciliation after the conflict ends.
The economic situation in Europe as a whole is precarious, but the situation in Greece is worse than anything we saw during the Great Depression of the 1930s. The inability of Greece to regain economic growth is, in large part, a result of the misguided “austerity” measures imposed on it by the EU and the IMF. The poverty of the policy is well-demonstrated by this long essay by C. J. Polychroniou, Unfortunately, the policies are similar to the ones being pushed in the US by those who support the Tea Party.
Parag Khanna is a senior research fellow at the New America Foundation and has written an op-ed piece for the New York Times on the end of the nation-state. It is a very insightful essay, but I’m not sure that the conclusion follows logically. I will concede that the complexity of the layers of authority in the contemporary world is mind-boggling, but I’m not sure that the ultimate power of the nation-state is being eroded. What we need to test that proposition is to see some sort of conflict between the nation-state and some of these completing authorities.
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It’s interesting that you identify the US interest to be for the Sunni rebels to not win and that the Saudi wants the Sunnis to win. Saudi Arabia does not want any Sunni group to win. They want specific Sunni groups that they helped formulate, fund, and strengthen. These groups echo their agenda and ideology, since Saudi Arabia does not care if the groups are radical or extreme. The original Sunni groups fighting were not the same groups Saudi backed up. Therefore, it is really interesting that the US did not see the opportunity they had in strengthening the more moderate Sunni groups from the beginning. I know a commander in the Free Syrian Army the Northern areas of Syria, where the Nusra and other radical Islamist groups are gaining the most ground, and he used to work for the Assad government, but couldn’t stand the killing and mayhem. He and many other like him, are very moderate, and he is fighting Nusra instead of Assad. Why did the US not back up these group and strengthen them when it could is something I have yet to understand.
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Thanks for the additional information. You are, of course, correct. What is interesting is that as time has gone on, the US finds itself with fewer and fewer options.
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